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FINANCIAL REPORTING IN 1920:
THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
Abstract: This study uses the 1920 Moody’s Analysis of Industrial 
Investments to assess the extent of financial reporting by U.S. indus-
trial companies. The reporting of an income statement and a balance 
sheet, as well as the amount of disclosure in both of these statements, 
is examined empirically to determine which economic factors influ-
ence this reporting. The results show that corporate-governance, op-
erating, and financing factors all significantly influence the reporting 
of financial statements and the extent of disclosure within those state-
ments. However, the significant factors vary across the two financial 
statements and the two decisions considered (reporting a particular 
statement and the amount of disclosure within the statement to re-
port). All factors are shown to influence significantly the decision to 
report both a balance sheet and an income statement and the amount 
of information to report in a balance sheet. The decision regarding 
the amount of information to report in an  income statement is only 
influenced by corporate-governance and operating factors.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the formation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and accounting standard-setting bodies, financial 
reporting for U.S. industrial companies was not regulated at 
the federal level. Companies were free to choose their own re-
porting policies. Financial reporting focused primarily on the 
balance sheet [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901; Gilman, 1939; 
Skinner, 1987; Kendig, 1993]. However, a number of companies 
did report income statements although few details of income 
components were included [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; Baldwin 
et al., 1992]. This study will examine empirically the factors 
Acknowledgments: We thank the editor and reviewers for their helpful com-
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that influenced these companies to disclose financial statements 
voluntarily and the amount of disclosure contained within those 
statements.
Coombs and Edwards [1995] developed a model for disclo-
sure as a function of the market for disclosure and regulation. 
This market included investor demand for information for deci-
sion making and firms supplying disclosure to attract capital. 
The role of regulation in this model is to ensure that the supply 
of disclosure does not fall short of demand. The authors note 
that regulation has taken on an increasing role during the 20th 
century. This model, then, recognizes the need for regulation to 
ensure adequate disclosure.
Bartlett and Jones [1997] examine motivations for voluntary 
disclosure in an environment where securities regulation exists. 
The paper concludes that the amount of voluntary disclosure is 
primarily attributable to the philosophy of the chairman of the 
Board of Directors (BD) and the chief financial officer (CFO). 
They found the main reasons to provide voluntary disclosure 
were to meet social pressure, to demonstrate responses to social 
pressure to prevent regulation, and to manage the corporate im-
age. These same motivations for voluntary disclosure may also 
exist in an era prior to securities regulation.
Merino and Neimark [1982] report that, in the late 19th 
century, U.S. businesses promised more voluntary disclosure to 
reduce the lack of competition and centralization of economic 
power when faced with political threats. This increase in vol-
untary disclosure was not adequate, and federal legislation was 
proposed annually from 1903-1914 and occasionally from 1919-
1930. The increase in voluntary disclosure that did occur was a 
response to social pressure to prevent regulation. 
Prior to 1897, most industrial securities were traded 
through the use of trust certificates.1 After 1897, stock in indi-
vidual companies was marketed but issued through promoters 
who gave shareholders confidence in the quality of the invest-
ment. (The promoters often were selling watered securities of 
little value, but the public was unaware and had faith in the 
promoters.) By 1902, shares of industrials were regularly traded 
on exchanges [Navin and Sears, 1955] which required investors 
1 Trust certificates represented ownership in a trust. The trust itself owned the 
corporations. These trusts were put together by financiers who chose the com-
panies to include in the trust, making ownership in a trust seem less risky than 
buying individual stock. Ownership in a trust certificate then would be similar to 
buying shares today in Berkshire Hathaway because of Warren Buffett’s proven 
expertise in picking investments.
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to perform their own analyses of companies or to rely on rating 
agencies for investment advice.
Therefore, during the early 20th century, the demand for 
public financial information came from investors. This market 
required a plentiful supply of securities, expert advice from 
investment intermediaries, and useful financial information 
[Bryer, 1993]. The first two of these requirements existed by 
1920. However, the existence of useful financial information was 
a debated issue. 
Michael [1996] reports investor dissatisfaction with disclo-
sure in the U.S. as early as 1900. Kohler [1926] expresses dis-
satisfaction with published financial information for analysis. 
This paper indicates that less than 20% of balance sheets could 
be considered useful for analysis. Senatra and Frishkoff [1984] 
echo the same concerns. While using reports from 1925, they 
could not perform adequate financial-statement analysis given 
incomplete income-statement information. Couchman [1928] 
criticizes the balance sheet only reporting model of the day for 
not showing users where an organization is going. This paper 
concludes that a statement that shows the results of operations 
is necessary to assess the investment potential of a company. 
Edwards [1989a] notes that the criticisms of accounting in 
the U.K. in 1920-1930 were excessive summarization, failure to 
prepare consolidated statements, failure to publish a profit-and-
loss account, and excessive use of secret reserves. Many of these 
same deficiencies existed in U.S. reporting as the British model 
was closely followed. The first three of these criticisms relate to 
financial-statement disclosure.
These papers indicate that there was social pressure during 
the years around 1920 to promote voluntary disclosure by com-
panies. Merino and Neimark [1982] also note the existence of 
threatened regulatory action. Further, Hawkins [1963] indicates 
that between 1920 and 1927, the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion of America sought, through voluntary actions, to standard-
ize the information regarding industrial securities presented to 
the public and called for both a balance sheet and an income 
statement, again providing evidence that companies of the day 
were considering these social pressures in their disclosure deci-
sions. 
Taken together, this literature shows that the 1920 era 
was a time when social pressure for increased disclosure and 
threatened legislative or regulatory action were present in both 
the U.S. and the U.K. This situation created an environment 
in which both the models proposed by Coombs and Edwards 
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[1995] and Bartlett and Jones [1997] would suggest that com-
panies would logically react by increasing voluntary disclosure. 
Yet, the empirical reality is that many companies continued to 
provide minimal financial-statement disclosure. Other com-
panies did seem to respond to the calls for increased disclosure 
and put out considerable amounts of information. As a result, 
the supply of financial information was very company specific 
and primarily relates to the philosophy of the BD chairman and 
the CFO as posited by Bartlett and Jones [1997]. Merino et al. 
[1994] provide some era-specific evidence by discussing the dif-
ferences in reporting style and the use of audits by companies 
controlled by J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. Perhaps other 
economic factors in the operating environment of the company 
may have influenced the decision of these policy makers within 
the company to choose a particular level of disclosure.
What motivated a company to issue financial statements 
during this era of voluntary disclosure? By becoming aware of 
the economic factors in the operating environment of firms that 
voluntarily disclosed financial information, the development of 
financial reporting in the U.S., as well as the need for and effect 
of accounting regulation, can be increasingly understood.
Barton and Waymire [2004] assert that the quality of finan-
cial reporting is a function of information costs in securities 
markets, contracting and control conflicts among stake holders, 
competitive and political costs, and available alternative in-
formation. For firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) in 1929, the results indicate that the quality of financial 
disclosure increased if the firm operated in a technology-based 
industry, had recently issued common equity, or was highly 
levered. The quality of financial disclosure decreased with the 
age of the firm, if the firm issued dividends, or if the firm was 
regulated. The study concludes that the quality of financial dis-
closure increases with economic incentives to provide informa-
tion to investors.
Archambault and Archambault [2005] find that regu-
lated utilities typically reported income statements in the 1915 
Moody’s Analyses of Investments (Moody’s). They also report that 
industrial companies that are listed on a stock exchange were 
more likely to issue both income statements and balance sheets 
than were unlisted companies. The conclusion of that study was 
that regulation, either externally imposed as in the case of rail-
roads and utilities or self-imposed as in the case of listed compa-
nies, increased disclosure. That study focused on the regulatory 
component of Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] disclosure model.
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The current study uses a similar approach and data set as 
Archambault and Archambault [2005], but examines a different 
issue. The focus of the current paper is on the motivations for 
companies to disclose information voluntarily. Industrial com-
panies are chosen as the sample because the companies did not 
have any external regulatory pressure for disclosure. Therefore, 
this study seeks to develop a more complete understanding of the 
motivation to report financial information for industrial firms, 
focusing on the supply of disclosure component in the Coombs 
and Edwards disclosure model. To examine this issue, the paper 
will concentrate on various economic factors faced by companies 
in their operating environment to determine if these factors help 
explain the variation in disclosure during this time period.
This study utilizes a sample of 200 industrial firms ran-
domly selected from the 1920 Moody’s. This sample represents 
an earlier stage of financial reporting in the U.S. than that 
studied by Barton and Waymire [2004]. In addition, this study 
includes listed and unlisted firms, which is a broader, more gen-
eralized sample than firms listed on the NYSE only. The current 
paper focuses on incentives to disclose a balance sheet and/or 
an income statement. Barton and Waymire [2004] concentrated 
primarily on overall financial-reporting quality but did report 
weak results in explaining balance-sheet transparency. Thus, this 
study extends our knowledge of influences on financial reporting 
in the early 20th century by extending the time period back and 
by broadening the types of firms examined.
The factors considered in this investigation are corporate-
governance, operating, and financing factors. Both the decision 
to report a statement, either the income statement or the bal-
ance sheet, and the extent of disclosures within the statements 
will be examined.
Developing a better understanding of what disclosure oc-
curred and the influential economic factors leading companies 
to choose more extensive disclosure will help us understand 
the historical development of accounting and the role regula-
tion plays in ensuring full disclosure. The efficient operation of 
capital markets relies on sufficient disclosure to prevent finan-
cial manipulation, to provide investors with enough financial 
information to make resource-allocation decisions, and to allow 
equal access to important information [Benston, 1973]. The re-
sults indicate that there were a number of important factors that 
influenced disclosure. However, the results also indicate that 
some companies did not experience the economic circumstances 
that promote voluntary statement disclosures. 
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201058
Income-statement reporting is shown to be positively as-
sociated with corporate-governance, operating, and financing 
factors. Companies that seek broader ownership by having 
shares traded on an organized exchange, companies that have 
increased complexity in terms of international operations and 
larger size, and those that met capital needs by issuing debt or 
equity securities in the past three years or have their equity secu-
rities rated by Moody’s are more likely to issue an income state-
ment. Companies with an insider-focused, corporate- governance 
structure as measured by the portion of the BD that are officers 
are less likely to issue an income statement. Companies with 
high debt-to-asset ratios were also found to be less likely to issue 
income statements.
Balance sheets are more likely to be issued by companies 
seeking broader ownership by trading common shares on an or-
ganized exchange, having complex operations with international 
activity, and issuing additional capital (both debt and equity) 
within the last three years. Financing factors were also shown 
to reduce the likelihood of issuing a balance sheet. Companies 
with rated bonds were negatively associated with balance-sheet 
issuance. 
The amount of disclosure was shown to be positively re-
lated to having traded shares and operating factors of increased 
complexity and size. Total disclosure was negatively influenced 
by insider-focused corporate governance. The extent of balance-
sheet disclosure showed similar results. Additional positive 
influences for balance-sheet disclosure are having bond and eq-
uity ratings and having higher return on assets. The amount of 
income-statement disclosure was associated positively only with 
the complexity of operations and negatively with the lack of an 
independent BD and company age. 
By finding a number of economic factors associated with 
voluntary statement reporting, the paper provides a link to the 
supply of voluntary financial-statement information beyond 
corporate-governance philosophy as documented in Bartlett and 
Jones [1997]. However, the paper also finds that, consistent with 
the Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] model of disclosure and regu-
lation, not all firms possess the economic circumstances that are 
associated with increased voluntary financial reporting. 
The next section of the paper discusses the literature and 
develops hypotheses concerning the relationship between vari-
ous firm characteristics and disclosure levels. This is followed 
by a section that will discuss the data and methodology used to 
determine which economic factors are significantly associated 
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with disclosure levels. The results of those tests are then ana-
lyzed. The last section provides a summary and conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Separation of ownership and management is thought to cre-
ate a need for financial disclosure [Berle and Means, 1968]. Fi-
nancial reporting did not exist before corporations and financial 
markets [Parker, 1986]. Therefore, growth in the corporate form 
of business created a demand for financial-statement disclosure. 
A market in industrial corporations formed by 1902 [Navin and 
Sears, 1955]. Hawkins [1963] reports that the sources of change 
in financial-statement reporting were the public responsibility 
of managers, the criticism of financial reporting, government 
regulation, and development of generally accepted accounting 
principles. These sources are all related to the business environ-
ment. As noted earlier, these social pressures can give rise to 
an increased demand for financial-statement disclosure. How-
ever, companies determine the supply within the constraints 
of government regulation. A number of economic factors in 
the operating environment of a company may influence the 
corporate-governance team of a company regarding the amount 
of financial information it decides to supply. Table 1 presents the 
factors that will be considered in this study and their expected 
effect on the financial statements. 
TABLE 1







H1 Listing Status + +
H2 Board Control - -
H3 State of Incorporation + +
Operating Factors:
H4 Complexity + +
H5 Longevity - -
H6 Profitability +
H7 Size + +
Financing Factors:
H8 Securities Rating + +
H9 Securities Issuance + +
H10 Leverage + +
H11 Dividends + +
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Corporate-Governance Factors: When a new firm comes into 
 being, choices exist regarding its form of organization. Since 
all of the companies in this study are corporations, a demand 
is created for financial information. The amount of disclosure 
demanded by an owner increases as the owner becomes further 
removed from the operations of the corporation. This dispersion 
of ownership is another choice a company faces. A company 
that remains closely held by a few dominant shareholders could 
supply fewer disclosures than a widely held corporation with 
thousands of shareholders. One of the easiest ways to achieve 
dispersed ownership is to list the company’s shares on an orga-
nized exchange. This listing comes with a set of requirements 
that must be met to receive the privilege of listing. These require-
ments exist, in part, to provide investors with the information 
they need to make informed investment decisions. Thus, a cor-
poration, in choosing to list on an exchange, is voluntarily choos-
ing to supply more financial disclosure. The increased disclosure 
may be required by the exchange or may be volunteered by the 
corporation to attract investors. This study will use the listing 
status of a company to proxy for the economic circumstance of 
increased ownership dispersion. As an example of the imposed 
disclosure requirements of organized exchanges, the NYSE re-
quired in 1900 newly listed companies to issue an annual report 
disclosing a balance sheet and income statement, to hold an an-
nual meeting, and to distribute proxy statements [Gross, 2002]. 
The literature also supports the relationship between increased 
disclosure and listing status. Archambault and Archambault 
[2005] report that pre-regulation firms listed on stock exchanges 
were more likely to disclose an income statement and a balance 
sheet. Singhvi and Desai [1971] found increased disclosure for 
firms trading on public exchanges relative to those traded over-
the-counter. Therefore, firms that desire increased ownership 
dispersion by listing shares on an organized exchange are ex-
pected to have more financial-statement disclosure. 
H1: Firms that trade on an organized exchange are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
Another economic factor that may influence disclosure 
choices is the composition of the BD. The BD is the sharehold-
ers’ representative and is to make decisions about the company’s 
operations. Because the composition and philosophy of the BD 
varies widely among companies, its composition will be used as 
a variable to test one aspect of governance.
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Management-controlled firms may be in a better position to 
limit disclosure costs by practicing the “British Secretive Model” 
with minimal disclosure and a balance-sheet focus [Michael, 
1996]. Bryer [1993] notes that in the early 20th century, the BD 
in British companies regularly limited public disclosure but pro-
vided auditors and shareholders with internal information be-
yond the published financial statements. Guy and Leung [2004] 
report that firms with a CEO also serving as the BD chairperson 
have less voluntary disclosure. Disclosure decreases with in-
creased managerial ownership [Eng and Mak, 2003]. This prob-
ably also occurs because managers have access to additional 
information and owner-managers have an incentive to keep that 
information private so that they can be the ones to earn higher 
returns on that insider knowledge. Firms with a more indepen-
dent BD membership have smaller abnormal accruals [Klein, 
2002]. Firms with outside BD members are more likely to issue 
earnings forecasts [Ajinka et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005].
The literature, then, indicates that including more outsiders 
on the BD increases the amount of external disclosure. This can 
result from a reduced management incentive to act on insider 
information and a stronger external-shareholder focus result-
ing from more independent BD members. These findings are all 
consistent with the expectation that, as the number of officers 
on the BD increases, the reporting of income statements and 
balance sheets should decrease.
H2: Firms with a higher proportion of officers on the 
BD are less likely to issue financial statements and will 
provide less disclosure within those statements.
Another factor influencing the governance of the corpora-
tion is the set of laws that govern its existence. A corporation is 
a citizen of the state in which it seeks incorporation. This state 
is chosen by the BD. Most companies incorporate in the state 
where it is headquartered, but some choose another state when 
the BD seeks a set of laws (governance restrictions) that better 
suit the corporation’s needs. 
New Jersey enacted corporation laws during the late 1800s 
that attracted a large number of firms from other states [Stoke, 
1930]. Delaware and several other states enacted similar laws 
in the early 1900s before World War I [Grandy, 1989]. States 
competed against each other by offering lower tax rates and 
more liberal laws. Dodd and Leftwich [1980] compare two ex-
planations for firms changing their state of incorporation – the 
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s tockholder-exploitation hypothesis asserts that firms change 
in order to extract wealth from the stockholders, and the cost-
avoidance hypothesis stresses that the change enables the firm 
to minimize the cost of production, investment, and financing 
activities. This paper reports positive abnormal returns before 
and around the announcement of the change in venue of in-
corporation and concludes that the results do not support the 
stockholder-exploitation hypothesis. Jagannathan and Pritchard 
[2008] find that Delaware corporations have higher-quality di-
rectors and CEOs. Barton and Waymire [2004] predict that firms 
incorporated in Delaware will provide higher-quality financial 
reporting due to a more intensive monitoring by shareholders. 
However, they find an insignificant effect on reporting. Since 
Delaware and New Jersey were leaders in enacting laws with 
the purpose of attracting incorporations, this study will test cor-
porate governance by grouping companies incorporated there 
separately from those incorporating in other states.
H3: Firms that choose to incorporate in Delaware and 
New Jersey are more likely to issue financial statements 
and will provide more disclosure within those state-
ments.
Operating Factors: While all companies in the sample are indus-
trial companies, other operating factors besides industry could 
create economic circumstances that would lead to differences 
in the financial-statement disclosures a particular company will 
make. The operating factors considered in this study are com-
plexity of operations (firms with subsidiaries and international 
operations), longevity of the entity (the number of years the 
company has existed), profitability of operations (return on as-
sets), and size of the entity (total assets).
The more diverse and complex an entity’s operations be-
come, the more information users need to evaluate those op-
erations. One way to measure complexity is by the number of 
subsidiaries. Also, as a company expands operations to global 
markets, operations become more complex. Zarzeski [1996] 
finds that disclosure needs increase with the number of subsid-
iaries and with foreign operations. To attract more resources 
and inform investors, more disclosure is needed as the complex-
ity of operations increases.
H4: Firms that have more complex operations are more 
likely to issue financial statements and will provide 
more disclosure within those statements.
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The longevity of the firm may also influence disclosure 
policy. As a firm ages, it proves the viability of its business 
model, operating capabilities, and management expertise. A 
newer firm needs to disclose more information about these 
issues to the financial markets to establish its viability as a 
going concern. Chen et al. [2002] note that younger firms are 
more likely to disclose balance sheets voluntarily along with 
quarterly earnings announcements. Wasley and Wu [2006] 
report that young firms voluntarily disclose good news in 
cash-flow forecasts to signal economic viability. Barton and 
Waymire [2004] also report a negative relation between age 
and financial-reporting quality. These results suggest that 
young firms are expected to be more likely to disclose balance 
sheets and income statements to help users better assess the 
firm’s viability.
H5: Firms that have been in existence longer are less 
likely to issue financial statements and will provide less 
disclosure within those statements.
Financial statements are the means for a company to 
disclose its results of operations and financial position. The 
amount of that information may vary based on the economic 
per formance of the entity in a given period. More profitable 
firms may be more willing to disclose income-statement infor-
mation [Singhvi and Desai, 1971]. Patton and Zelenka [1997] 
and  Raffournier [1995] also find a positive relation between 
profitability and disclosure. However, Alsaeed [2005] finds no 
association between profitability and disclosure. Profitable 
firms have more good information to disclose so may have more 
information within their financial statements. However, this 
increased disclosure may be limited to the income statement 
which focuses on profitability. This study will use return on as-
sets as the measure of profitability.
H6: Firms that have higher return on assets are more 
likely to provide more disclosure within the income 
statement.
Larger firms have been shown in the literature to disclose 
more information [Hawkins, 1963; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999]. Stanga [1976] lists possible economic mo-
tivations for larger firms disclosing more information: greater 
public attention, more existing and potential stockholders, less 
competitive pressure, and greater ability to afford increased 
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disclosure. Thus, larger firms are expected to have more 
 financial-statement disclosure.
H7: Firms that are larger (as measured by assets) are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
Financing Factors: As a company grows, it needs additional capi-
tal to fund growth. U.S. output of finished goods from 1909-1918 
was $56.4 billion while corresponding output from 1919-1928 
was $83.4 billion [Bean, 1945]. Rajan and Zingales [2003] docu-
ment similar growth in the stock market during this time period. 
Thus, the time period under study was one of considerable eco-
nomic growth. Companies could finance this growth either with 
internal or external sources. Since most firms paid out most of 
their earnings as dividends prior to 1920 [Previts and Merino, 
1979], the companies in this study were probably seeking signifi-
cant sources of external financing. Companies could choose to 
issue either debt or equity to satisfy these needs. The financing 
factors associated with capital-structure choice are measured by 
the existence of a rating for debt or equity securities, the issu-
ance of debt and equity securities, the debt-to-assets ratio, and 
the dividend-payout ratio.
Morrison [1935] states that public information about com-
panies should be directed at investors so that they can make 
buy, sell, and hold decisions. To aid investors in these decisions, 
Moody’s provided ratings for debt and equity securities based on 
public information. To receive a debt rating, 1915 Moody’s re-
quired that the client firm disclose an income statement. While 
an income statement was not required to receive a stock rating, 
one of the components considered in the rating did require an 
income statement. Therefore, a more informed stock rating 
would result from the issuance of an income statement. These 
ratings could be used by investors to help them make investment 
decisions. Obtaining stock and bond ratings could be considered 
a type of social pressure. As noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997], 
meeting social pressure is a motivator for increased disclosure. 
Additionally from the issuers’ perspective, having a rating for 
the company’s stock or debt could then be associated with a 
decreased cost of capital and an easier placement of new issues 
if the rating attracted more interest. Since a lower cost of capital 
and easier placement would be a desire of most companies, ad-
ditional disclosure to acquire that rating would be an artifact of 
obtaining that rating. Thus, firms with rated debt and equity are 
expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
65Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting
H8: Firms that have ratings associated with existing 
stock and bond issues are more likely to issue financial 
statements and will provide more disclosure within 
those financial statements.
The desire for a rating associated with debt or equity to at-
tract investors at the lowest possible cost of capital is primarily 
a concern of a firm when stock or bonds are issued. It is this is-
suance of new stock, either common or preferred, or bonds that 
would allow a company to obtain additional capital to meet its 
expansion needs. After issuance, ratings help keep the market 
for these securities, but the rating is only directly beneficial for 
attracting additional capital for firms when they issue new se-
curities. Morrison [1935] discusses the importance of providing 
adequate information to attract new investors. Most companies 
did not provide adequate information in the time period under 
study. However, issuing new securities would create an incentive 
for the firm to provide more financial disclosure to attract inves-
tors. Barton and Waymire [2004] report that firms that have 
recently issued equity disclose higher-quality financial informa-
tion. Therefore, firms that have recently issued debt or equity 
are expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
H9: Firms that have issued debt or equity securities 
within the past three years are more likely to issue fi-
nancial statements and will provide more disclosure 
within those statements.
The type of external financing used by a company may in-
fluence the amount of disclosure. Debt financing is associated 
with greater risk. One way to measure the relative use of debt 
to finance a company’s resources is the debt-to-assets ratio. 
Financial leverage tends to increase disclosure [Wallace et al., 
1994; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barton and 
Waymire, 2004]. This follows from the need of the firm to show 
that it can service this debt level. Thus, firms with a higher debt-
to-assets ratio are expected to be more likely to issue an income 
statement and a balance sheet. 
H10: Firms that have a higher debt-to-assets ratio are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
The net income of a company can either be paid as divi-
dends or retained. Companies with a lower dividend-payout ra-
tio are relying more heavily on internal financing. The literature 
provides some documented relationships between dividends 
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and disclosure. Dividends may act as an alternative source of 
information about the amount and timing of future cash flows 
[Miller and Rock, 1985]. Firms that pay dividends may disclose 
less financial information [Barton and Waymire, 2004]. How-
ever, Archambault and Archambault [2003] report that dividend-
paying firms are associated with greater disclosure to allow 
investors to evaluate the ability of the firm to continue dividends 
[Einhorn, 2005]. The literature is mixed concerning the relation-
ship between dividends and disclosure.
Edwards [1989b] notes that, at the turn of the 20th century 
in the U.K., performance of a firm was judged mainly in terms 
of the amount of dividends paid. This view of dividends would 
seem to be more consistent with Einhorn [2005] than Miller and 
Rock [1985]. 
Tax laws in effect during and immediately after World War I 
may also have affected disclosure. Corporate income taxes were 
a function of return on invested capital [Kohler, 1925]. Balance 
sheets may have been more conservative as a result [Montgom-
ery, 1919]. Companies had incentives to write-off assets or recog-
nize liabilities in order to reduce taxable income. These actions 
may increase or decrease the amount of disclosure in financial 
statements.
However, dividends reduce invested capital and, conse-
quently, increased taxable income. Firms that paid dividends 
may have had an incentive to disclose more information in or-
der to justify the dividends. Therefore, in this paper, the positive 
relationship between dividends and disclosure will be used as 
the basis for hypothesis development.
H11: Firms that have a higher dividend-to-net income 
ratio are more likely to issue financial statements and 
will provide more disclosure within those statements.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To examine which economic factors influence a firm’s volun-
tary disclosure of financial-statement information, those made 
in 1920 were chosen, relating to the 1919 fiscal year financial 
statements. This year was selected because it predated the SEC 
but was late enough into the 20th century that individual indus-
trial firms had achieved economic significance and served as an 
investment alternative for those seeking returns [Baskin, 1988]. 
The disclosures were obtained from a random sample of 
200 industrial firms incorporated in the U.S. that were not whol-
ly owned subsidiaries from the 6,882 companies comprising 
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Moody’s 1920 edition. The sample was limited to industrial firms 
because other types of companies, such as utilities, railroads, 
banks, etc., were generally subject to some form of regulation 
that required certain disclosures.2 The focus of the paper is on 
U.S. companies to keep the economic and cultural environment 
consistent throughout the sample. A number of ownership-
related variables were considered as explanations for voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, publicly traded companies needed to be 
used because the information disclosures of wholly owned sub-
sidiaries could be much different because of the lack of outside 
shareholders. 
The pages in Moody’s covering each selected company were 
examined to determine whether an income statement and bal-
ance sheet were provided. To calculate the amount of detail pro-
vided in the financial statements, the number of line items in the 
financials was collected. In counting line items, totals and subto-
tals were not considered if previously disclosed items were used 
to generate them. However, if a statement started with a subto-
tal, like net earnings, then the total or subtotal was counted as 
an item since it then represented a distinct disclosure. 
Other data items collected from Moody’s included: total 
debt; total assets; dividends; net income; equity issues, either 
common or preferred, in the past three years; bond issues in the 
past three years; bond and stock ratings; the exchange on which 
common stock is listed; the dates of company origination and 
incorporation; incorporation and headquarters state; existence 
of subsidiaries and/or international operations; number of BD 
members; and the number of officers serving on the BD. Net in-
come was seldom labeled as such. Any subtotal listed on the in-
come statement before dividends were deducted was considered 
net income. The financial-statement disclosure items are used to 
compute the debt-to-assets ratio, the dividend-payout ratio, and 
the return-on-assets ratio. Firm size is measured by total assets. 
The variable used in the study for the age of the company is the 
older of the age of origination or incorporation. The percentage 
of officers on the BD is used to measure the Board’s indepen-
dence. 
For the multiple regressions, a company missing any of the 
data items collected could not be used in the multi-variate anal-
ysis. Because of missing data, the sample was reduced to 191 
companies when the regression did not require data from either 
2 See Archambault and Archambault [2005] for a discussion of the types of 
regulatory disclosures required of railroads and utilities. 
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financial statement, 142 companies when a balance sheet but 
not an income statement was required, 100 companies when an 
income statement was required but not a balance sheet, and 86 
companies when both balance-sheet and income-statement data 
were required for the regression equation. Least-squares regres-
sion was used to examine what factors influence total statement 
disclosure and its extent in each statement. The dependent vari-
able was the number of line items reported. The more line items 
a company reported, the more detail provided by its statements. 
Enhanced detail represents broader information provided by 
companies to statement users.
For examining the existence of the statements, a logit model 
is used. The dependent variable is dichotomous, coded as one if 
the balance sheet or income statement was reported by Moody’s. 
Five sets of regressions resulted in the form as follows:
DISCLOSURE = a +b1EX + b2BO + b3DLNJ + b4SUB + b5INT + 
b6AGE + b7ROA + 
b8TA + b9BR + b10CR + b11BI + b12EI + b13DA + b14DPO + e
where:
DISCLOSURE  one of the five measures of disclosure (income- 
statement existence, balance-sheet existence, 
number of line items in the income statement, 
number of line items in the balance sheet, total 
number of line items in the income statement 
and balance sheet taken together)
EX dichotomous variable where 1 = traded on any 
organized exchange3
BO number of officers on the BD divided by number 
of members on the BD
3 The tests were also run using the NYSE listing coded as one and all other 
companies coded as zero. The significance of the exchange variable was the same 
for all models tested whether it was coded as any exchange or only NYSE. The 
any exchange measure was chosen for reporting in the study for two reasons. 
First, some exchanges other than the NYSE may have had statement disclosure 
requirements for listing and would therefore have the same effect on voluntary vs. 
involuntary disclosure as the NYSE listing. Second, using any exchange as the in-
dependent variable resulted in higher adjusted R2 and F-statistics, indicating bet-
ter statistical fit than only the NYSE. The other exchanges included are New York 
Curb, Boston, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Providence, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, San 
Francisco, Philadelphia, Louisville, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Toronto, Montreal, 
London, and Amsterdam. 
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DLNJ dichotomous variable where 1 = incorporated in 
Delaware or New Jersey
SUB dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a 
subsidiary
INT dichotomous variable where 1 = company has 
international operations
AGE number of years that the company has been in 
existence (using either the date of incorporation 
or date of origin, whichever is longer ago)
ROA net income divided by total assets
TA total assets4
BR dichotomous variable where 1 = company has 
rated bonds
CR dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a 
rated common stock
BI dichotomous variable where 1 = company is-
sued bonds within the past three years
EI dichotomous variable where 1 = company is-
sued equity within the past three years
DA total debt divided by total assets
DPO total dividends divided by net income.
A second multi-variate model was also estimated which 
left out the variables that required statement information (TA, 
DA, DPO, ROA). This was done to allow a multi-variate regres-
sion without requiring the existence of the financial statements. 
This is especially important for the income-statement and 
balance-sheet existence models because with the statement be-
ing required, the companies without a statement would not be 
included in the model estimation. Since this model is trying to 
explain why an income statement or a balance sheet may have 
been disclosed, the dependent variable needs to include some 
observations where the statement did not exist. The full model 
allows a test of the importance of the financial-statement vari-
4 Total assets are used in the study rather than the more commonly used log 
of total assets because using log of total assets caused the goodness-of-fit test to 
fail for some of the regressions. Because of the model-fit issue, total assets in mil-
lions are reported.
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ables considered. Therefore, two multi-variate models are used.
Pearson correlations between the independent and depen-
dent variables are also reported to examine whether a significant 
relationship exists between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable without considering the other independent 
variables.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The N 
column indicates how many of the 200 companies in the sample 
had data for each variable. This table indicates that 56% of the 
sample provided an income statement and 74% provided a bal-
ance sheet. The considerably lower percentage of companies 
providing an income statement relative to a balance sheet is con-
sistent with Skinner [1987] and Buckmaster and Jones [1997]. 
The existence of 26% of the sample that did not report a balance 
sheet is inconsistent with the literature that concludes that 
almost all U.S. firms published a balance sheet [Brief, 1987]. 
The average income statement consisted of just three line items. 
Balance sheets provided considerably more disclosure with an 
average of just over 14 items. This is consistent with findings in 
the literature that few details about income components were 
reported in the early 20th century [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; 
Baldwin et al., 1996]. The items in the income statement were 
also more likely to be summary numbers such as gross profit 
with no detail of the components of the subtotal. Only 31% of 
the companies reporting an income statement disclosed gross 
revenues.
Only 30% of the sample companies traded stock on an 
organized exchange. Officers represented 45% of the BD mem-
bers on average. Delaware and New Jersey were successful in 
their efforts to attract incorporations with 26% of the sample 
incorporating in those two states. The majority of companies 
had a subsidiary (59%). International operations existed for 
39% of the sample firms. The median age of a company in the 
sample was 16 years. Thus, new companies do not dominate the 
sample. Return on assets averaged 8%. The size of companies in 
the sample varies considerably as seen by the standard deviation 
of total assets. A bond rating exists for only 37% of the sample, 
and only 18% issued debt in the three prior years. Equity issues 
were more common with 26% of the sample issuing some form 
of equity in the prior three years with 95% having a common-
stock rating. The sample firms were not highly levered with a 
debt-to-asset ratio of 0.19 on average. The dividend-payout ratio 
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was high with 51% of profits being paid as dividends on average.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Income Statement 200 0.56 1.00 0.50
Balance Sheet 200 0.74 1.00 0.44
Income Statement Items 112 3.37 3.00 1.80
Balance Sheet Items 148 14.16 14.00 4.62
Traded on Exchange 200 0.30 0.00 0.46
Percentage of Board that are Officers 191 0.45 0.43 0.20
Incorporated in Delaware or New 
Jersey 200 0.26 0.00 0.44
Subsidiaries 200 0.59 1.00 0.49
International Operations 200 0.39 0.00 0.49
Age 200 20.17 16.00 18.47
Return on Assets 96 0.08 0.07 0.06
Total Assets (in millions) 148 43.25 10.00 199.69
Bond Rating 200 0.37 0.00 0.48
Common Rating 200 0.95 1.00 0.22
Bond Issues 200 0.18 0.00 0.39
Equity Issues 200 0.26 0.00 0.44
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 148 0.19 0.15 0.15
Dividend-Payout Ratio 104 0.51 0.43 2.32
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. The variables are defined as 
Income Statement = 1 if the firm issued an income statement and 0 otherwise. 
Balance sheet = 1 if the firm issued a balance sheet and zero otherwise. Income 
Statement Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the income 
statement. Balance Sheet Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the 
balance sheet. Traded on Exchange = 1 if the company trades on any organized 
exchange (see footnote 3 for a list of exchanges) and zero otherwise. Percentage 
of Board that are Officers = number of officers on the Board of Directors dividend 
by number of members of the Board of Directors. Incorporated in Delaware or 
New Jersey = 1 if the company is incorporated in either Delaware or New Jersey 
and zero if it is incorporated in any other state. Subsidiaries = 1 if the company 
has subsidiaries and zero otherwise. International Operations = 1 if the company 
has international operations and zero otherwise. Age = number of years that the 
company has been in existence (using either the date of incorporation or date 
of origin, whichever is longer ago). Return on Assets = net income dividend by 
total assets. Total Assets (in millions) = total assets dividend by 1,000,000. Bond 
Rating = 1 if the company has a bond rating listed in Moody’s and zero otherwise. 
Common Rating = 1 if the company has a common stock rating listed in Moody’s 
and zero otherwise. Bond Issues = 1 if the company issued bonds within the past 
three years and zero otherwise. Equity Issues = 1 if the company issued any form 
of equity within the past three years and zero otherwise. Debt-to-Assets Ratio 
= total debt dividend by total assets. Dividend-Payout Ratio = total dividends 
divided by net income.
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Total Disclosure: To examine which environmental factors are 
related to total voluntary financial-statement disclosure, the 
sum of the number of the income-statement and balance-sheet 
line items was used as the dependent variable. The results of 
this total disclosure test are shown in Table 3. The correlations
TABLE 3













Constant 14.48 4.74*** 13.92 4.70***
Traded on 
Exchange 0.37*** 2.58 2.63*** 2.54 2.47***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.16 -5.47 -2.14*** -6.03 -2.22**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.23** -0.15 -0.14 -0.76 -0.70
Subsidiaries 0.47*** 3.64 3.50*** 3.81 3.55***
International 
Operations 0.22** 0.40 0.40 -0.23 -0.22
Age of Company -0.12 -0.03 -0.92 -0.04 -1.11
Return on Assets -0.16 10.37 1.28
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.41*** 0.01 3.59***
Bond Rating 0.21** 1.48 1.14 0.88 0.64
Common Rating 0.12 3.06 1.08 2.65 1.00
Bond Issues 0.16* 0.88 0.59 -1.60 -0.95
Equity Issues 0.12 1.23 1.17 1.60 1.47
Debt-to-Assets 
Ratio 0.20** 4.96 1.03
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.05 0.19 0.69
Adjusted R2 29.8% 42.2%
F-statistic (p-Value) 5.21 0.000 5.44 0.000
N 100 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
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between the dependent and independent variables are shown in 
part 1 of Table 3. Significant positive correlations exist for trad-
ing on an exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey, 
having subsidiaries and international operations, being larger, 
having rated bonds, issuing bonds, and being more highly le-
vered. No significant negative correlations exist.
To examine the factors that explain total disclosure when 
all factors are considered together, multi-variate regressions 
were estimated. The results are shown in Parts 2 and 3 of Table 
3. Part 2 is the regression without financial-statement variables 
and Part 3 shows the results for the complete model. The model 
in Part 2, which required the existence of either an income state-
ment or a balance sheet, has an adjusted R2 of 29.8%, indicating 
reasonable explanatory power of the variables considered but 
also implying other significant factors as well. The explana-
tory power increases considerably in the Part 3 regression (R2 of 
42.2%) as more variables are added. The results for both models 
are consistent. Requiring the existence of both an income state-
ment and a balance sheet in the Part 3 model does not signifi-
cantly change the results, adding only total assets as a significant 
variable but not changing the significance of any other variable.
When all variables are considered together, trading on any 
organized exchange, having a subsidiary, and being larger are all 
associated with increased total disclosure. A negative relation-
ship between total disclosure and the percentage of officers on 
the BD is documented. These results indicate that a significant 
relationship exists between total disclosure and at least one vari-
able within two of the three economic factors considered in this 
study – corporate governance and operating. Thus, disclosure is 
a function of various influences. 
Archambault and Archambault [2005] also document a pos-
itive relationship between listing status and a voluntary disclo-
sure of statements. The disclosure of statements was generally 
required by the exchanges by 1920. Thus, documenting this sup-
port for H1 is not surprising. Operations become more complex 
with the existence of subsidiaries and international operations. 
This increased complexity seems to create an incentive to re-
port more voluntary disclosures to help users of the statements 
understand performance. Some companies did report gross or
net revenues from different operating sources separately which 
would increase the amount of disclosure, supporting H4. 
Operations become subject to more public and political 
scrutiny as companies grow larger [Stanga, 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986]. The positive relationship between disclo-
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sure and firm size is consistent with many previously reported 
findings [Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999] and H7. 
Corporate governance is also shown to play a role in the 
amount of total disclosure. Less independent BDs disclose less. 
Bartlett and Jones [1997] note the importance of corporate- gov-
ernance philosophy and voluntary-statement disclosures. These 
results provide support for a relationship between BD member-
ship and statement disclosure as well, consistent with H2.
Some of the variables found to have a significant rela-
tionship with disclosure in the correlations do not end up as 
significant in the multi-variate models. This result could occur 
if variables exhibit multicolinearity. However, standard tests 
for multicolinearity, both correlation matrices and variance-
inflation factors, indicate that no strong multicolinearity exists 
among the independent variables. These differences between 
uni-variate and multi-variate results are similar to those in 
Singhvi and Desai [1971]. That study looked at total disclosure 
for companies in 1965. The uni-variate results showed that dis-
closure was significantly related to size, number of shareholders, 
listing status, CPA firm, profitability, and earnings margin. The 
multi-variate results were reduced to only listing status and 
earnings margin being significant.
This analysis examines total disclosure; however, one or 
more factors may influence a company to report only an income 
statement or a balance sheet. Some factors may influence a 
company to disclose more balance-sheet information and less 
income-statement information at the same time. Looking at 
total disclosure then provides an incomplete understanding of 
the factors that motivate the issuance of each statement. Some 
factors may be important in the reporting of both statements, 
but other factors may strongly influence the decision to disclose 
one statement and have little effect on the decision to report the 
other. The analysis will now examine the two statements sepa-
rately.
Income-Statement Disclosers: Since only 56% of the sample 
reported an income statement, what factors motivated these 
companies to make this disclosure? Table 4 shows the results of 
the correlation between that dichotomous variable and each in-
dependent variable and the regression equations.5 Trading on an 
5 Results for dividend payout and return-on-assets are not reported because 
these two ratios require the existence of an income statement to be reported. 
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exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey, having sub-
sidiaries and international operations, having a common-stock 
rating, and issuing either bonds or equity within the past three 
















Constant -0.96 -0.98 052 0.40
Traded on Exchange 0.38*** 2.08 4.51*** 1.93 2.96***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.17** -1.69 -1.91** -2.76 -2.19**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.14** -0.03 -0.07 -0.56 -0.93
Subsidiaries 0.17** -0.19 -0.46 -0.74 -1.30
International 
Operations 0.26*** 1.30 2.82*** 1.18 1.87**
Age of Company -0.08 -0.01 -0.60 0.01 1.09
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.11 0.06 2.27**
Bond Rating 0.05 -0.36 -0.82 1.43 1.80**
Common Rating 0.12* 1.18 1.37* 2.15 1.87**
Bond Issues 0.17** 1.56 2.67*** -0.30 -0.34
Equity Issues 0.16** 0.56 1.32* 0.39 0.72
Debt-to-Assets -0.04 -2.72 -1.55#
Log-Likelihood -101.4 -60.6
Zero Slopes Test 
(p-Value) 59.30 0.000 19.51 0.000
N 191 142
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correla-
tions. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
Therefore, the equation could not be estimated since only those companies with 
income statements had these variables.
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an income statement. The higher the representation of manage-
ment on the BD, the less likely the company is to disclose an in-
come statement. These results are very similar to the results for 
total disclosure reported in Table 3. Firm size and bond rating 
are shown to be significant determinants of total disclosure, but 
not for presenting an income statement. Disclosing an income 
statement is shown to be a function of having rated common 
stock and recently issued debt and equity.
Parts 2 and 3 of Table 4 examine the multi-variate relation-
ship between these factors and the existence of an income state-
ment. Logit regression is used to see which variables are still 
significant in explaining the provision of an income statement 
when all variables are considered. The model in Part 2 looks 
at companies regardless of which financial statements were re-
ported. The Part 3 results relate to companies that had a balance 
sheet and may or may not have had an income statement. The 
results do vary, indicating that the decision to report an income 
statement is influenced by different factors if the decision to 
report a balance sheet has already been made. The results also 
differ significantly from the results for total disclosure. 
The Part 2 results indicate that corporate-governance (trad-
ing on an exchange and the percentage of officers on the BD), 
operating (international operations), and financing (common 
rating and bond and equity issuance) factors all significantly 
influence the decision of a company to publish an income state-
ment. The variables that explain the existence of an income 
statement when a balance sheet exists (Part 3) differ in that 
additional operating (total assets) and financing (bond rating 
and debt-to-asset ratio) factors gained significance while the 
constructs for issuing debt and equity lost significance.
For a company to achieve broader ownership interest by 
listing on an exchange, the company may have been required 
to publish an income statement as an exchange require-
ment. Also,having this statement would allow easier investor 
analysis, so having the income statement is consistent with 
the desire for broader ownership. This result supports H1. 
Corporate governance through BD membership is again sig-
nificant. A less independent BD results in a lower likelihood 
of reporting an income statement. With fewer shareholder 
representatives on the BD, the needs of shareholders for 
adequate information were not considered, supporting H2.
Having international operations increases the likelihood of 
reporting an income statement in both multi-variate regressions. 
However, having subsidiaries is not significant. Thus, only the 
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complexity factor of international operations motivated compa-
nies to issue an income statement. This result is consistent with 
H4. Firm size is also a significant influence when it was consid-
ered in the model. This positive relationship is consistent with 
H7. These results support the importance of operating factors in 
the decision to report net income.
Having a bond rating only significantly enhances the likeli-
hood of an income statement when a balance sheet is present. 
This variable was significant while issuing bonds was not. In 
a multi-variate model, these two variables may be proxies to 
some extent for one another, conceivably explaining the change 
in significance. Common-stock rating is significant in both 
models, while equity issues are only significant in Part 2. The 
debt-to-asset ratio is significant in Part 3, showing a negative 
relationship. This result is opposite to expectation. However, the 
hypothesis did assume that the companies have the ability to 
service the debt. If highly levered firms seemed unable to service 
their debt, not reporting an income statement would then be one 
way to cover up this issue. All financing variables considered are 
significant in one or both models. Thus, the need for additional 
funds and the make-up of the capital structure seem significant 
motivators in issuing income statements. Overall these results 
show that a number of factors influence a company’s decision to 
report an income statement. When comparing these results to 
others in this study, it becomes clear that income statements are 
issued more frequently when equity ratings and bond issuance 
occur. Income statements are frequently issued when a company 
wants investors to buy its stock or bonds or to continue a mar-
ket in the company’s securities. Firm size is also a significant 
factor. Larger companies may have become large through equity 
and bond issuance, thereby appreciating the need for continued 
disclosure of income to keep shareholders interested in com-
pany securities. With only 56% of the sample issuing income 
statements, it may be hypothesized some form of regulation was 
necessary to encourage wider reporting.
Income-Statement Items: The previous analysis examined 
income-statement disclosure. However, traded companies on 
most exchanges had to provide an income statement. Therefore, 
disclosing an income statement was not totally voluntary for 
some of the 30% of the sample that traded on an organized ex-
change. However, the amount of income-statement information 
disclosed was voluntary.
Least-squares regressions and correlations are used to de-
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termine which environmental factors help explain the amount 
of income-statement disclosure. Part 1 of Table 5 reports the 
results for the correlation between income-statement items and 
the independent variables. International operations are shown
TABLE 5













Constant 4.73 4.03*** 4.57 3.57***
Traded on 
Exchange 0.12 0.45 1.18 0.22 0.50
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.14* -1.27 -1.36* -1.47 -1.25
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
-0.02 -0.45 -1.10 -0.19 -0.40
Subsidiaries 0.04 0.33 0.83 -0.31 -0.67
International 
Operations 0.19** 0.67 1.76** 0.60 1.33*
Age of Company -0.19* -0.03 -2.68*** -0.03 -2.09**
Return on Assets -0.08 1.82 0.52
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.10 0.00 0.97
Bond Rating 0.08 0.03 0.07 -0.46 -0.78
Common Rating 0.00 -0.46 -0.43 -0.66 -0.58
Bond Issues 0.11 0.41 0.72 -0.07 -0.10
Equity Issues 0.04 0.12 0.78 -0.01 -0.02
Debt-to-Assets 
Ratio 0.11 2.24 1.07
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.05 0.06 0.52
Adjusted R2 5.9% 0.0%
F-statistic (p-Value) 1.63 0.109 0.79 0.680
N 100 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted. 
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to have a positive influence on the amount of income-statement 
disclosure. Officers on the BD and company longevity both re-
duce the amount of information in the income statement.
To examine the effect of considering all variables together, 
the multi-variate models are estimated in Parts 2 and 3 of Table 
5. The results in Part 2 are for companies with an income state-
ment regardless of whether a balance sheet exists. Part 3 results 
include the financial-statement variables, so the sample includes 
companies with both statements. Neither of these models is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the 
amount of income-statement disclosure is a function of factors 
other than those considered in this study. The significance of BD 
composition and age may be indicating that entrenched manage-
ment/BD philosophy on reporting may be a key determinant of 
the amount of disclosure as noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997]. 
No variable is included in the model to measure this philosophy 
and, if a sufficiently significant variable does exist, it could ex-
plain the model misspecification indicated by the results.
Balance-Sheet Disclosers: Correlations and regressions are also 
estimated to examine which environmental factors influence 
the existence of a balance sheet.6 Different factors may influence 
why a company chooses to report a balance sheet rather than an 
income statement in the era before SEC requirements. As shown 
in Table 2, 74% of the companies reported a balance sheet. 
The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Part 1 of 
Table 6. These results indicate that being traded on an exchange, 
being incorporated in New Jersey or Delaware, having a subsid-
iary and international operations, and issuing equity within the 
past three years are all associated with issuing a balance sheet. 
Having rated bonds was shown to reduce the likelihood of re-
porting a balance sheet. 
Part 2 of Table 6 shows the results of the multi-variate 
logit regression for the sample of all companies regardless of 
the statements issued. The logit regression for firms issuing 
income statements and a balance sheet or not would not con-
verge. Therefore, results of a second multi-variate model are 
not reported since statistically, no logistic regression model
6 Results for total assets, debt-to-assets ratio, and return-on-assets are not re-
ported because these variables require the existence of a balance sheet, and the 
model needs to consider both firms with and without a balance sheet to explain 
the existence of the statement. 
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TABLE 6






Variable Coefficient Coefficient t-Stat
Constant 0.32 0.35
Traded on Exchange 0.22*** 1.17 2.32***
Percentage of Board that are 
Officers -0.09 -0.77 -0.84
Incorporated in Delaware or New 
Jersey 0.15** 0.53 1.06
Subsidiaries 0.15** 0.04 0.09
International Operations 0.19*** 1.04 1.92**
Age of Company -0.00 0.01 0.66
Bond Rating -0.12# -1.05 -2.39##
Common Rating 0.07 0.40 0.50
Bond Issues 0.06 1.07 1.79**
Equity Issues 0.23*** 1.44 2.46***
Log-Likelihood -90.7
Zero Slope Test (p-Value) 33.99 0.000
N 191
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correla-
tions. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
could be estimated. The model in Part 2 indicates that trading 
on an exchange, having international operations, and issuing 
bonds or equity are positively associated with issuing a balance 
sheet. Rated debt has a negative association with a balance 
sheet. Therefore, corporate-governance, operating, and financ- 
ing  factors are important in explaining a balance-sheet disclo-
sure.
The exchange variable is probably significant because of im-
posed exchange requirements. Complexity of operations again 
encourages firms to issue more financial-statement information. 
However, H4 is only supported with respect to international op-
erations.
The bond and stock issuance variables are again significant 
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for reducing cost of capital and providing potential buyers with 
needed information about financial position and the company’s 
ability to meet its capital needs. These results are consistent 
with H9.
The negative relationship between debt rating and the is-
suance of a balance sheet did not meet the expectation that 
companies with traded debt were doing well financially and 
would issue statements to keep a market in the securities. If the 
company is too highly levered, then the company may not want 
to report a balance sheet showing the true level of debt. H8 is 
not supported by these results.
Balance-Sheet Items: Correlations of the independent variable 
and the number of balance-sheet line items disclosed in Moody’s 
were estimated. The results are shown in Part 1 of Table 7. These 
results show the same significant variables as for total disclosure 
in Table 3 with the exception of a rating on common stock in-
creasing the amount of disclosure and a less independent BD 
lowering the amount of balance-sheet disclosure.
Part 2 of Table 7 estimates a least-squares regression 
of balance-sheet items using all companies with a bal-
ance sheet. The results indicate that corporate-governance, 
operating, and financing factors are all important in ex-
plaining how much balance-sheet disclosure is made. The 
specific significant variables that increase the amount of 
balance-sheet disclosure are trading on an exchange (H1), hav-
ing subsidiaries (H4), and having rated debt and equity (H8).
Once again, expanding the breadth of ownership, having 
complex operations, seeking new capital, or maintaining a mar-
ket in existing capital are all associated with greater disclosure 
in the balance sheet. The positive relationship between the 
amount of disclosure and security ratings is interesting given the 
negative association between debt ratings and reporting a bal-
ance sheet. This combined result seems to indicate that once the 
balance sheet is issued, ratings encourage additional disclosure. 
Part 3 of Table 7 provides the multi-variate results on the 
sample of companies that issue both a balance sheet and an 
income statement. The results are again similar to those for 
total disclosure (Part 3 of Table 3) with the addition of return-
on-assets and equity issuance as variables that lead to greater 
balance-sheet disclosure. 
Overall, the disclosure model presented seems to explain the 
choices concerning total disclosure, the issuance of an income 
statement, and the amount of balance-sheet disclosure. The















Constant 9.86 5.37*** 9.15 3.89***
Traded on Exchange 0.38*** 2.63 3.50*** 2.40 2.94***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.18** -1.83 -1.01 -4.24 -1.98**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.25*** 0.61 0.75 -0.52 -0.60
Subsidiaries 0.42*** 2.34 3.04*** 4.16 4.87***
International 
Operations 0.21*** 0.67 0.88 -0.77 -0.92
Age of Company -0.10 -0.00 -0.16 -0.01 -0.25
Return on Assets -0.15 8.60 1.34*
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.42*** 0.01 3.94***
Bond Rating 0.25*** 1.55 1.59* 1.34 1.23
Common Rating 0.15* 2.44 1.48* 3.20 1.52
Bond Issues 0.19** 0.71 0.62 -1.52 -1.14
Equity Issues 0.07 0.05 0.07 1.43 1.67**
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 0.17** 3.16 0.82
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.09 0.13 0.59
Adjusted R2 26.2% 51.1%
F-statistic (p-Value) 6.12 0.000 7.43 0.000
N 142 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
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models for income-statement disclosure and issuance of a bal-
ance sheet do not perform as well. While some factors are only 
significant in one of these decisions, other factors are generally 
shown to influence all facets of voluntary disclosure. 
Table 8 provides a summary of the results from the other 
tables. To control for potential overfitting of results, a variable
TABLE 8
Results Summary
















Exchange + + + +
Percentage of 
Board that are 
Officers
- - - -
Incorporated 









Assets + NA NA
Total Assets + + + NA
Financing Factors:
Bond Rating + -
Common 
Rating + +
Bond Issues + +




Payout Ratio NA NA
This table summarizes significant results reported in Tables 2-6. A variable 
had to be significant in at least two specifications within a table or significant in 
the only multi-variate model in which it was included to be summarized in this 
table.
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needed to be significant in at least two specifications within a 
table or be significant in the only multi-variate model in which 
it is included to be considered significant in this summary. The 
table shows that trading on an exchange, lack of an independent 
BD, having complex operations, and firm size are important 
variables for total disclosure decisions. Therefore, corporate-
governance and operating factors influence overall statement 
disclosure. Financing factors are shown to influence individual 
statements but not total disclosure. Equity ratings and issuing 
securities are shown to increase the likelihood to report an in-
come statement and securities ratings are associated with more 
disclosure of information in the balance sheet. This seems to 
indicate that financing issues had different influences on the 
two financial statements. Thus, companies wanting to broaden 
ownership and seeking additional equity capital are most likely 
to provide a full set of financial statements with reasonable 
amounts of information. Complexity of operations also shows 
a positive relationship with disclosure. Firms with subsidiaries 
have increased amounts of disclosure, and those with interna-
tional operations tend to issue both statements more frequently. 
Larger companies are also more likely to provide greater state-
ment disclosure. Corporate governance is shown to be related 
to a heightened number of income statements but not balance 
sheets. The volume of disclosure is increased in both.
The summary in Table 8 also shows that the amount of 
disclosure is primarily a function of corporate governance, 
complexity of operations, and firm size, while the issuance of 
statements is a function of corporate-governance, complexity of 
operations, and financing factors. The factors influencing a com-
pany to report either financial statement are very similar with 
the exception of BD independence and securities ratings. This 
finding that BD independence is only influential in the decision 
whether to report an income statement but not in the decision 
of whether to report a balance sheet provides some support for 
the conclusion of Bartlett and Jones [1997] that BD philosophy 
influences the amount of voluntary disclosure. Balance-sheet 
disclosure was a more common practice as noted by the larger 
number of firms issuing a balance sheet both in this study and in 
the literature indicates that their promulgation was a common 
practice of the day [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901, Gilman, 
1939; Skinner, 1984; Kendig, 1993]. Therefore, balance sheets 
may not have been viewed as voluntary to many companies, 
while income statements were voluntary until they became a re-
quirement for listing on an exchange. Thus, the BD philosophy 
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on disclosure could more readily influence whether an income 
statement was published along with a balance sheet. 
The amount of disclosure within the statements is shown 
to be influenced by many more factors for the balance sheet 
than for the income statement. This contrasts with Barton and 
Waymire’s [2004] finding that more factors explain income-
statement transparency than for balance sheets. However, the 
multi-variate models for income-statement disclosure were not 
significant, indicating that variables other than those considered 
here are better explanatory factors of the volume of income-
statement disclosure. The amount of balance-sheet disclosure is 
also shown to be a function of corporate-governance, operating, 
and financing factors. 
This study examined factors that would influence a com-
pany’s decision regarding the voluntary supply of information. 
The results indicate that there are some important factors that 
influence the decision to issue a statement and the amount of 
information contained therein. Corporate-governance, operat-
ing, and financing factors all play a role in the disclosure deci-
sions of companies, but those factors vary in their importance 
in different decisions. The results indicate that disclosure deci-
sions are complex and take multiple factors into account. Since 
various factors were shown to influence the types of statements 
reported and the amount of information conveyed, the results 
confirm the conclusion of Coombs and Edward [1995] that 
regulation is needed to equate the supply of financial-statement 
disclosure provided by companies in response to the demands of 
stockholders.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined financial-statement disclosures by 
industrial companies as reported in the 1920 Moody’s. The pa-
per looked at overall disclosure and disclosure particular to the 
individual statements. The focus of the paper was to determine 
which company-specific factors would affect the corporate 
decision to disclose financial statements and the amount of 
disclosure. By looking at these factors, the motivation of firms 
to disclose voluntarily as in the Coombs and Edwards [1995] 
model can be understood.
The model developed in this paper can be used to explain 
factors that influenced the issuance of an income statement as 
well as the contents of both financial statements. The model 
provides some insight regarding the amount of information in 
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the income statement and the issuance of a balance sheet, but 
the model did not fit the data as well for these two corporate 
decisions. The results showed that corporate-governance, oper-
ating, and financing factors are important, but that their relative 
importance varied by the specific disclosure decision under con-
sideration.
A company was more likely to issue an income statement if 
it traded shares on an organized exchange, had international op-
erations, was relatively larger, had securities rated by Moody’s, 
and issued bonds and/or equity in the recent past. Having a large 
percentage of officers on the BD and/or a high debt-to-asset ra-
tio reduced the likelihood. The decision to issue a balance sheet 
was positively influenced by trading on an exchange, having 
international operations, and issuing stock and bonds, but not if 
already existing debt was rated.
Factors influencing total disclosure and balance-sheet 
disclosure are similar. Trading on an exchange, possessing sub-
sidiaries, and relatively small size were shown to increase the 
amount of disclosure. Both measures were negatively influenced 
by BD composition. Balance-sheet disclosure was also positively 
influenced by return-on-assets and rated debt and equity. The 
equation used to estimate the amount of information disclosed 
in the income statement was not significant. However, three sig-
nificant coefficients resulted, indicating that income-statement 
disclosures are greater for companies with international opera-
tions and lower for older companies and those with a less inde-
pendent BD.
Seeking broader ownership by trading on an exchange was 
shown to be significant in most types of disclosure decisions. As 
noted earlier, exchanges did impose requirements for issuing 
statements. Therefore, for these traded companies, statement 
disclosure was not entirely a voluntary choice. However, traded 
companies consistently reported more information which shows 
more voluntary disclosure beyond the mere issuance of the 
statement. Also, the choice to list securities for trading would in-
volve consideration of all requirements to list. One requirement 
is statement disclosure. Thus, when a company chose to list 
securities voluntarily, a simultaneous choice to report financial 
statements was also voluntarily made. 
Complex structures with the existence of subsidiary or in-
ternational operations were also important for all disclosure de-
cisions. Such companies consistently reported more statement 
information as is consistent with the literature [Zarzeski, 1996]. 
Corporate governance was also shown to be an important factor. 
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Greater managerial involvement on the BD led to reduced dis-
closure in both statements and a decreased likelihood of report-
ing an income statement. This is also consistent with the litera-
ture [Klein, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Guy and Leung, 2004]. 
The results do indicate that incentives did exist in the pre-
SEC era to encourage companies to disclose financial state-
ments. However, the data and results show that smaller, domes-
tic businesses with a BD controlled by management that neither 
traded on an organized stock exchange nor sought additional 
capital recently were highly unlikely to report an income state-
ment voluntarily. These characteristics would seem to describe 
entrepreneurial firms that were growing rapidly within the econ-
omy of the early 1920s. Many of these small, founder- focused 
companies have grown into large, profitable corporations today. 
The results of this study clearly document that many of these 
companies lacked the incentives to provide the additional disclo-
sure considered typical for an efficient capital market [Senatra 
and Frishkoff, 1984] before regulatory intervention. This varia-
tion in economic factors encountered by firms created a gap 
between the supply and demand for disclosure as modeled by 
Coombs and Edwards [1995]. The economic factors faced by 
some companies encouraged the decision not to disclose a state-
ment or to disclose less then the amount of information wanted 
by market participants [Kohler, 1926]. These results are similar 
to those reported in Murphy [1988], who examined Canadian re-
porting and concluded that regulation was a necessary prerequi-
site for complete disclosure. This paper likewise concludes that 
many companies lacked the incentives to provide full financial 
disclosure without regulatory intervention.
REFERENCES
Ahmed, K. and Courtis, J.K. (1999), “Associations between Corporate Charac-
teristics and Disclosure Levels in Annual Reports: A Meta-Analysis,” British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 31, No. 1: 35-61.
Ajinka, B., Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P.R. (2005), “The Association between 
Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management 
Earnings Forecasts,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 3: 343-376.
Alsaeed, K. (2005), “The Association between Firm-Specific Characteristics and 
Disclosure: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” Journal of American Academy of Busi-
ness, Vol. 7, No. 1: 310-321.
Archambault, J.J. and Archambault, M.E. (2003), “A Multinational Test of Deter-
minants of Corporate Disclosure,” International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 
38, No. 2: 173-194.
Archambault, J.J. and Archambault, M.E. (2005), “The Effect of Regulation on 
Statement Disclosures in the 1915 Moody’s Manuals,” Accounting Historians 
Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1: 1-22.
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201088
Baldwin, T.J., Berry, R.H., and Church, R.A. (1992), “The Accounts of Consett 
Iron Company, 1864-1914,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 22, No. 
86: 99-109.
Bartlett, S. and Jones, M.J. (1997), “Annual Reporting Disclosures 1970-90: An 
Exemplification,” Accounting, Business & Financial History, Vol. 7, No. 1: 
61-80.
Barton, J. and Waymire, G. (2004), “Investor Protection under Unregulated Fi-
nancial Reporting,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 38, No. 1-3: 
65-115.
Baskin, J.B. (1988), “The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain 
and the United States, 1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information,” 
Business History Review, Vol. 62, No. 2: 199-237.
Bean, L.H. (1945), “Postwar Output in the United States at Full Employment,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 27, No. 4: 202-203.
Benston, G.J. (1973), “Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation 
of the Securities Act of 1934,” American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 1: 
132-155.
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1968), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, rev. 
edn. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.).
Brief, R.P. (1987), “Corporate Financial Reporting at the Turn of the Century,” 
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 163, No. 5: 142-157.
Bryer, R.A. (1993), “The Late Nineteenth Century Revolution in Financial Re-
porting: Accounting for the Rise in Investor or Managerial Capitalism?” Ac-
counting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 18, No. 7/8: 649-690.
Buckmaster D. and Jones, S. (1997), “From Balance Sheet to Income Statement: 
A Study of a Transition in Accounting Thought in the USA, 1926-1936,” Ac-
counting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2: 198-211.
Chen, J.S., DeFond, M.L., and Park, C.W. (2002), “Voluntary Disclosure of Bal-
ance Sheet Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements,” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2: 229-251.
Coombs, H.M. and Edwards, J.R. (1995), “The Financial Reporting Practices of 
British Municipal Corporations 1835-1933: A Study in Accounting Innova-
tion,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 25, No. 98: 93-105.
Couchman, C.B. (1928), “Limitations of the Present Balance Sheet,” Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. 46, No. 4: 253-269.
Dodd, P. and Leftwich, R. (1980), “The Market for Corporate Charters: Unhealthy 
Competition Versus Federal Regulation,” Journal of Business, Vol. 53, No. 3, 
Part 1: 259-283.
Edwards, J.R. (1989a), “Accounting: Ignore History at your Peril,” Accountancy, 
Vol. 103, No. 1,149: 184-185.
Edwards, J.R. (1989b), A History of Financial Accounting, (London: Routledge).
Einhorn, E. (2005), “The Nature of the Interaction between Mandatory and Vol-
untary Disclosures,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 4: 593-622.
Eng, L.L. and Mak, Y.T. (2003), “Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclo-
sure,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 4: 325-345.
Gilman, S. (1939), Accounting Concepts of Profit (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company).
Grandy, C. (1989), “New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,” Jour-
nal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 3: 677-692.
Gross, D. (2002), “Tried and True,” Your Market (New York: New York Stock Ex-
change): 24-27.
89Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting
Guy, F.A. and Leung, S. (2004), “Board Leadership, Outside Directors’ Expertise 
and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures’,” Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, Vol. 23, No. 5: 351-379.
Hawkins, D.F. (1963), “The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Pract-
ices among American Manufacturing Corporations,” Business History Re-
view, Vol. 32, No. 3: 135-168.
Jagannathan, M. and Pritchard, A.C. (2008), “Does Delaware Entrench Manage-
ment?” University of Michigan Law School John M. Olin Center for Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series, paper 93. 
Karamanou, I. and Vafeas, N. (2005), “The Association between Corporate 
Boards, Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Em-
pirical Analysis,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43, No. 3: 453-486. 
Kendig, W.L. (1993), “The Evolution of Private Sector Accounting and its Rela-
tionship to the Federal Chief Financial Officers Act,” Government Accoun-
tants Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3: 9-16.
Kittredge, A.O. (1901), “Cotton Mill Accounting,” Commerce Accounts and Fi-
nance, Vol. 2, No. 4: 1, 8-11.
Klein, A. (2002), “Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earn-
ings Management,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3: 
375-400.
Kohler, E.L. (1925), Accounting Principles Underlying Federal Income Taxes (Chi-
cago: A.W. Shaw Company).
Kohler, E.L. (1926), “Tendencies in Balance Sheet Construction,” Accounting Re-
view, Vol. 1, No. 4: 1-11.
Lee, T.A. (1979). “The Evolution and Revolution of Financial Accounting: A Re-
view Article,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 9, No. 36: 292-299.
Meek, G.K., Roberts, C.B., and Gray, S.J. (1995), “Factors Influencing Voluntary 
Annual Report Disclosures by U.S., U.K., and Continental European Mul-
tinational Corporations,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26, 
No. 3: 555-572.
Merino, B.D., Mayper, A.G., and Sriram, R.S. (1994), “Voluntary Audits in New 
York Markets in 1927: A Case Study,” Journal of Business Finance and Ac-
counting, Vol. 21, No. 5: 619-642.
Merino, B.D. and Neimark, M.D. (1982), “Disclosure Regulation and Public Pol-
icy A Socialhistorical Reappraisal,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 
Vol. 1, No. 1: 33-57.
Michael, R.R. (1996), “Voluntary Disclosure in a Nineteenth Century American 
Corporation: The Demise of Managerial Information as a Significant Ele-
ment of Financial Reporting,” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2: 
1-33.
Miller, M.H. and Rock, K. (1985), “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Informa-
tion,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 4: 1031-1051.
Montgomery, R.H. (1919), “Influence of the War on Balance Sheets,” Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. 28, No. 1: 1-8.
Moody, J. (1915), Moody’s Analyses of Investments Part II Public Utilities & Indus-
trials (New York: Moody’s Investment Service).
Moody, J. (1920), Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments (New York: Moody’s 
Investment Service).
Morris, R.D. (1984). “Corporate Disclosure in a Substantially Unregulated Envi-
ronment,” Abacus, Vol. 20, No. 1: 52-86.
Morrison, P.L. (1935), “Reports to Stockholders,” Accounting Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 1: 77-83.
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201090
Murphy, G.J. (1988), The Evolution of Selected Annual Corporate Financial Re-
porting Practices in Canada 1900-1970 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.).
Navin, T.R. and Sears, M.V. (1955), “The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securi-
ties, 1887-1902,” Business History Review, Vol. 29, No. 2: 105-138.
Parker, R. (1986), “Corporate Financial Reporting in the U. K.,” Australian Ac-
countant, Vol. 56, No. 8: 80-82.
Patton, J. and Zelenka, I. (1997), “An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of 
the Extent of Disclosure in Annual Reports of Joint Stock Companies in the 
Czech Republic,” European Accounting Review, Vol. 6, No. 4: 605-626.
Previts, G.J. and Merino, B.D. (1979), A History of Accounting in America (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons).
Raffournier, B. (1995), “The Determinants of Voluntary Financial Disclosure by 
Swiss Listed Companies,” European Accounting Review, Vol. 4, No. 2: 261-
280.
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (2003), “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Finan-
cial Development in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 69, No. 1: 5-50.
Senatra, P.T. and Frishkoff, P.A. (1984), “Financial Statement Analysis: The 1920s 
and the 1980s,” Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, Vol. 66, No. 10: 40-51.
Singhvi, S.S. and Desai, H.B. (1971), “An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Finan-
cial Disclosure,” Accounting Review, Vol. 46, No. 1: 129-138.
Skinner, R.M. (1987), Accounting Standards in Evolution (Toronto: Rinehart and 
Winston of Canada, Ltd.).
Sprague, C.E. (1901), “The General Principles of the Science of Accounts,” Com-
merce Accounts and Finance, Vol. 1, No. 8: 7-8.
Stanga, K.G. (1976), “Disclosure in Published Annual Reports,” Financial Man-
agement, Vol. 5, No. 4: 42-52.
Stoke, H.W. (1930), “Economic Influences upon the Corporation Laws of New 
Jersey,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 38, No. 5: 551-579.
Wallace, R.S.O., Naser, K., and Mora, A. (1994), “The Relationship between the 
Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm Characteristics 
in Spain,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 25, No. 97: 41-53.
Wasley, C.E. and Wu, J.S. (2006), “Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash 
Flow Forecasts?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 44, No. 2: 389-429.
Watts R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1986), Positive Accounting Theory (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall). 
Zarzeski, M.T. (1996), “Spontaneous Harmonization Effects of Culture and Mar-
ket Forces on Accounting Disclosure Practices,” Accounting Horizons, Vol. 
10, No. 1: 18-37.
